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We examine an incentive scheme for a group of agents, where all agents are rewarded if 
the group meets its target. If the group does not meet its target, only the agents that meet 
their individual target are rewarded. In environmental policy, the EU burden sharing 
agreement and the UK Climate Change Agreements feature this incentive scheme. There 
is only a difference in outcome between group and individual rewards if emissions are 
stochastic. Group rewards generally lead to higher expected emissions than individual 
rewards. The attraction of the group reward scheme may lie in its fairness and its tough-
looking targets.  
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1. Introduction 
Consider the following incentive scheme: A group of actors takes on a group target, 
which is broken down into individual targets. If the group meets its target, everyone is 
rewarded. If the group does not meet its target, only the agents who met their individual 
targets are rewarded. We are aware of two such cases in environmental policy: The EU 
burden sharing agreement and the UK climate change agreements. 
In the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-15 as a whole committed to an 8% reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2008-2012 from their 1990 level. The Member States later distributed 
this reduction among themselves in the so-called burden sharing agreement. According to 
the Kyoto Protocol, all Member States will be considered to have met their targets as long 
as the EU as a whole achieves the 8% reduction. If the EU-wide reduction is below 8%, 
the Member States that did not meet their burden sharing target will be held responsible. 
The UK imposed a climate change levy (CCL) on industrial energy consumers in 2001. 
Energy-intensive firms could get an 80% discount on the levy if they signed a Climate 
Change Agreement (CCA), promising to improve their energy efficiency. The 
government signed agreements with the sectoral organisations, and the sectoral targets 
were translated into targets per firm. Every other year the agreement is evaluated. If the 
sector meets the target laid down in the agreement, all firms in the sector (even those who 
didn’t meet their target) continue to receive the discount for the next two years. If the 
sector does not meet the target, the individual firms’ performance is assessed. The firms 
that met their target continue to receive the discount. The firms that didn’t meet the target 
don’t receive the discount for the next two years. 
While our model can also be applied to the EU burden sharing agreement, we would 
argue it applies best to industry (as in the UK CCAs). This is mainly because we assume 
the players act non-cooperatively. This is probably not the best way to model interaction 
between EU Member States, who meet regularly to discuss and decide issues in various 
fields of policy. When it is clear that the EU target is in danger, because one Member 
State cannot meet the burden sharing target, this puts pressure on the other Member 
States to reduce emissions beyond their burden sharing target. This is unlikely to occur   3
between firms in the UK Climate Change Agreements. In addition, there is not much of a 
sanction for countries failing to meet their Kyoto commitments.
3 
There is only a difference between group and individual rewards (both combined with 
individual sanctions) if there is the possibility of individual overachievement under group 
rewards. Then one agent can benefit from another agent’s overachievement. If each agent 
can set its emission level deterministically, all agents will just meet their individual 
targets, at least if the sanction is serious enough. In this case there is no difference 
between individual and group rewards. 
However, it seems quite plausible to assume that there is an element of chance. Firms 
cannot precisely predict the effect of their measures on their emissions. It depends on 
factors like market and economic conditions, the weather and the functioning of 
abatement equipment.
4 
Stochastic pollution has not been studied much in environmental economics. Beavis and 
Walker (1983a) consider the regulator’s problem in enforcing a percentile probabilistic 
constraint, where the probability that total emissions exceed a certain threshold should be 
below a certain percentage. They suggest a tax on the firm’s average emissions and their 
variance. Beavis and Walker (1983b) include emission trading and a fine if the firm’s 
estimated mean emissions exceed its permit holdings. Beavis and Dobbs (1987) further 
analyze percentile as well as mean probabilistic constraints. In the latter paper, as in the 
present paper and in Wirl and Noll (2005), the fine for exceeding the constraint is a fixed 
amount. Usually in the literature, the fine is increasing (typically linear) in the difference 
between actual and allowed emissions.
5 
Innes (2003) and Mrozek and Keeler (2004) show that tradable emission permits give 
firms more flexibility to handle stochastic emissions and are therefore preferable to non-
tradable permits with fines for non-compliance. In a rare empirical contribution, 
Bandyohapdhyay and Horowitz (2006) show that US plants with higher BOD discharge 
variability have lower median discharges. 
                                                           
3 Officially, the sanction is that for every ton by which a country fails its target in 2008-2012, it has to abate 
1.3 ton over and above its commitment for the next period. However, negotiations for the next commitment 
period only started in December 2005 and haven’t included targets yet. 
4 When the agents are governments, there is the added uncertainty of how firms and consumers respond to 
government policy.   4
In our model, under group rewards, each firm will exert less effort to reduce its emissions 
than with individual rewards. This is because the whole group benefits from one firm’s 
reduction in expected emissions. This reduction increases the probability that the industry 
as a whole will meet the target, so that other firms who don’t meet their individual target 
will still escape punishment. The firms are better off with group rewards when the targets 
remain constant. When the targets are adjusted to yield the same level of expected 
industry emissions, it is not clear which system the firms will prefer. 
The problem of how to get each member of a team to provide his optimal (but potentially 
unobservable) contribution has been widely studied, starting with Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) and Holmstrom (1982). Segerson (1988) was the first to apply Holmstrom’s 
(1982) approach to non-point pollution, where the emissions of each polluter cannot be 
measured and their contribution to total pollution is stochastic. She shows that the 
polluters can be induced to undertake the desired level of abatement by a combination of 
a tax/subsidy scheme for environmental quality below, respectively above, a cutoff point 
and a fixed fine for pollution above the cutoff point. Xepapadeas (1991), Cabe and 
Herriges (1992) and Horan et al. (1998) have subsequently refined the analysis of non-
point pollution. Whereas the non-point pollution literature does not allow for 
measurement of individual emissions, the team incentive literature does compare 
individual to group rewards (Che and Yoo, 2001; Kvaløy and Olsen, 2006). Che and Yoo 
(2001) find that while individual performance evaluation does worse than joint 
performance evaluation in a static setting, the former may be preferred in a dynamic 
setting. The group rewards/individual sanctions scheme that is the focus of the present 
paper has not been analyzed before. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the UK Climate Change 
Agreements. The model is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 shows that with 
deterministic emissions, there is no difference between group and individual rewards. In 
Section 5 we address the difference between group and individual rewards for stochastic 
emissions. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Horan (2001) examines the efficiency of several cost-effective control strategies when emissions are 
stochastic and environmental damage is uncertain.   5
2. The UK Climate Change Agreements
6 
The UK’s burden sharing target is a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 12.5% in 
2008–12 compared to 1990. The UK is one of the few OECD countries that is 
comfortably on course for meeting its target, thanks mainly to the “dash for gas” in the 
1990s, when many electricity generators switched from coal to gas.   
Following the Marshall (1998) report that advocated the use of economic instruments in 
climate change policy, the UK government imposed a Climate Change Levy (CCL) on 
industrial electricity, gas, LPG, coal and coke consumption from April 2001. The implicit 
rates per ton of CO2 range from £3 for LPG via £5 for coal to £10 for electricity 
(Glachant and de Muizon, 2006). In April 2007 the rates will be increased for the first 
time (by 2.6%). They will subsequently be adjusted for inflation each year. 
Energy-intensive firms could get an 80% discount on the levy when they entered into a 
Climate Change Agreement (CCA) with the government, promising to reduce their 
energy consumption. The scheme covers around 12,000 sites (5,500 companies) and 44% 
of total UK industry emissions (Glachant and de Muizon, 2006). The targets are mostly in 
relative terms (for instance in kWh primary energy use per hectolitre in the beer 
industry), although some sectors (aerospace, steel, supermarkets and wallcoverings) have 
absolute targets.
7 The targets are stated in terms of improvement over the base year 
(usually 1998, 1999 or 2000). These targets were agreed in so-called umbrella 
agreements between the government and the respective sectoral organisations in the 
months before the CCL came into force. The sectoral targets were subsequently 
translated into targets per firm in so-called underlying agreements. There are five targets 
for every other year from 2002 to 2010. Each milestone period runs from 1 October to 30 
September. The firms then have until February of the next year to account for their 
emissions. Defra (the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) evaluates 
the firms’ performance in March and usually publishes the results around July. If the 
                                                           
6 Most information in this section, unless otherwise indicated, was taken from the Defra website 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/ccl/index.htm, especially Defra (2003, 2005). See also de Muizon 
and Glachant (2004) and Glachant and de Muizon (2006) on the CCAs and OECD (2005) and Pearce 
(2006) on the CCL. 
7 Without additional regulation, there is the danger that firms with relative targets increase their output in 
order to generate allowances and sell them to firms with absolute targets, thereby raising total emissions. 
The so-called gateway mechanism was imposed to prevent this: a trade between firms with relative and 
absolute targets is allowed only if it leads to a net flow of allowances toward the relative sector.   6
sector as a whole meets its target, all firms in the sector are recertified and continue to 
receive the discount (even those who did not meet their individual target) for the next two 
years (starting from 1 April). If the sector does not meet the target, the individual firms’ 
performance is assessed. The firms that met their individual target are recertified and 
continue to receive the discount. The firms that didn’t meet the target are not recertified 
and don’t receive the discount for the next two years. 
All companies with CCA targets can participate in the UK Emission Trading Scheme 
(UK ETS), launched in April 2002. When the CCAs were initially negotiated, it was 
envisaged that emission trading would be allowed at some point, and so the CCAs 
contain provisions for emission trading. However it was still unclear at that point when 
emission trading would start and which form it would take. 
When a firm overcomplies, it can notify Defra of the amount of overcompliance. This is 
called ringfencing of emissions. If the firm does not ringfence its emissions, they will 
count toward sectoral compliance. If the firm wants to sell its ringfenced emissions or 
retire them for its own compliance in a later period, it needs to have the emissions 
verified. Verification costs about £1,000 (Glachant and de Muizon, 2006). The firm then 
receives allowances for its ringfenced emissions. 
In March 2002, the government organised a reverse auction for firms not covered by 
CCAs to join the ETS. These 34 so-called Direct Participants (DPs) received £215m to 
reduce their CO2 emissions by 4 Mton by the end of 2006. 
Table 1 summarizes the savings made by the CCA firms in the two target periods. These 
are the absolute savings from the emissions in the base year. According to our 
calculations, aggregate baseline emissions in the CCA sectors were around 90 Mton 
CO2.
8 Firms in the steel sector, and especially Corus, went through a difficult time around 
2001/02, experiencing a dramatic decline in output and, consequently, energy use. Since 
the steel sector is subject to an absolute energy target and is responsible for about a 
quarter of industrial primary energy use, Corus might have flooded the market with 
allowances, removing any energy saving incentive for all other firms. Therefore Defra 
negotiated stricter targets with the steel sector and did not allow Corus to sell its 
ringfenced emissions. Table 1 presents the original and (in brackets) the adjusted targets. 
                                                           
8 Details are available from the corresponding author upon request.   7
The beginning of the ETS was marked by delays in getting surplus emissions verified, 
causing the allowance price to rise rapidly to £12 at the end of the first compliance period 
(September 2002). Subsequently, allowance prices settled in the £2–5 range per ton of 
CO2 (Glachant and de Muizon, 2006). Table 2 summarizes market activity. The CCA 
firms that were inactive in the market ringfenced 3.2 Mton in period 1 and 5.4 Mton in 
period 2 without having it verified yet (Glachant and de Muizon, 2006). 
Table 3 summarizes the compliance results of the first two target periods. There were 
sectors where all target units were recertified, although the sector as a whole did not 
reach its target. There are two reasons for this. First, with relative targets, the sectoral 
target is the average of the firms’ targets, weighted by their expected output. If the more 
energy-intensive firms produce more than expected, the sectoral target may not be met, 
although all firms meet their own targets. Secondly, a firm can apply for an adjustment of 
its target on several grounds. This adjustment, however, is only reflected in the 
individual, not in the sectoral target. The grounds for target adjustment are:
9 
 
  Product mix and output (PMO): 
•  A change in the product mix that affects overall energy use per unit. 
•  A reduction in throughput that leads to an increase in energy intensity, because 
there is a base-load component of energy use. 
  Tolerance bands: A short delay in the implementation of an energy efficiency 
measure. 
  Relevant constraints: Government requirements that have led to an increase in energy 
consumption, for instance an unexpected denial of planning permission. 
 
The sectoral organizations collect the data from their members and forward them to 
Defra. If the sector as a whole meets the target, the sectoral organization only discloses 
the aggregate sectoral performance to Defra. This setup was chosen for data protection 
reasons and to reduce the workload to Defra. Thus, Defra does not have data on 
individual firms’ performance in sectors that achieved their target.   
                                                           
9 PMO is only applicable to relative targets. PMO and tolerance bands are mutually exclusive, and both are 
only permitted for the first three milestone periods.   8
For the first target period, we know which percentage of firms was recertified in the 
sectors with incomplete recertification. The sectors and the percentages in decreasing 
order are: British Poultry Council poultry meat rearing 99%, ceramics (whitewares) 98%, 
poultry meat processing 97%, red meat processing 97%, foundries 95%, metal packaging 
95%, ceramics (refractories) 93%, ceramics (materials) 91%, National Farmers Union 
poultry meat rearing 83%, egg production 68%. 
For the Vehicle Builders and Repairers Association, “[t]here were significant errors in the 
original data submitted… and, following detailed study only seven participants were re-
certified out of 34 with 2002 targets.” (Defra, 2003) In the second milestone period, the 
Association terminated the CCA “for business reasons” (Defra, 2005) as did the 
Reprotech sector. 
For the second milestone period, we don’t have recertification percentages in the sectors 
with incomplete recertification. “All facilities except one” (Defra, 2005) were recertified 
in the animal feed sector. “Most facilities” were recertified in the dairy and poultry meat 
processing sectors. The printers sector saw “a number of facilities de-certified”. 
As the food and drink sector failed its overall target, facilities were tested at the sub-
sector level. A number of subsectors also failed to meet their targets. The 2001 food and 
drink CCA lists eleven subsectors, but we don’t know which subsectors met their targets 
and which did not. Within the subsectors that failed their targets, “a number of facilities” 
failed to meet their individual targets and were de-certified. 
For our purposes it is interesting to find excess emission reductions, i.e. emission 
reductions that were not ringfenced (let alone verified). A firm’s excess emission 
reductions are not available for sale or for its own future compliance. Instead, they count 
toward the sectoral target, to the benefit of other firms in the sector that failed their own 
target. The quantity of excess reductions is not readily available from Defra publications 
or Glachant and de Muizon (2006). We have compiled a lower bound estimate of excess 
reductions by calculating, for every sector that reached its sectoral target,
10 the difference 
between its actual emissions and its target adjusted for trading and ringfencing. This 
understates actual excess reductions for two reasons. First, for the sectors that reached 
                                                           
10 We excluded the steel sector, because as discussed above, steel firms were not allowed to sell their 
ringfenced emissions.   9
their sectoral targets, we only have the sectoral or net excess reductions. These are the 
difference between gross excess reductions by firms that surpassed their individual target 
and shortfalls by those firms that did not meet them. Secondly, we cannot include excess 
reductions by firms in sectors that failed their sectoral target. In this way, we arrived at a 
lower bound for excess reductions of 3.2 Mton in period 1 and 0.2 Mton in period 2.  
Ekins and Etheridge (2006) analyse the results of the CCAs’ first target period. 
Negotiation between government and industry led to 2010 targets between the business-
as-usual (BAU) estimates and the improvements that would arise if the sector 
implemented all cost-effective energy efficiency measures, with both sets of estimates 
produced by the government’s advisers (then called ETS, now called Future Energy 
Solutions [FES]). Ekins and Etheridge (2006), however, estimate that for most sectors, 
the CCA targets are hardly any stricter than BAU. They find substantial overcompliance 
in the first compliance period. However, they argue that the CCAs have been very useful, 
because they made firms aware of the potential for energy-saving measures.  
The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for industrial CO2 emissions, which partly 
overlaps the UK climate change policy mix of CCL, CCAs and Emission Trading 
Scheme, started on 1 January 2005.
11 The main difference between the EU ETS and the 
UK scheme is that the former only covers direct CO2 emissions whereas the CCL also 
covers indirect CO2 emissions (i.e. electricity use). Accordingly, the EU ETS covers the 
power generation sector, whereas the UK CCL does not. Conversely, some sectors (e.g. 
chemicals and aluminium) are covered by the UK scheme, but not by the EU ETS. 
Member States could apply for their firms to opt out of the first stage of the EU ETS 
(2005-2007), provided that they are covered by equivalent regulation. The Commission 
granted an opt-out for the Direct Participants (until the scheme ended in 2006) and for the 
firms with a CCA. These firms could decide whether they wanted to join the EU ETS or 
stay in the CCA. The CCAs are set to continue for those sectors and those activities not 
covered by the EU ETS. Firms still have to pay the CCL when they join the EU ETS, but 
they only qualify for the 80% reduction if they stay in the CCA. 
 
 
                                                           
11 Boemare et al. (2003) discuss the tensions between the UK (and French) system and the EU ETS.   10
3. The model 
We analyze the abatement choices of polluting firms in the same industry. For simplicity, 
we let the industry consist of two firms. 
Each firm i, i = 1, 2, has a target Ti > 0 for emission reduction. We don’t model the firm’s 
output decision, so that there is no difference between relative and absolute targets.
12 The 
industry target T is the sum of individual targets:  2 1 T T T + = . Firm i undertakes 
abatement effort (or abatement, for short) ai. Its cost of ai is given by Ci(ai), with: 
0 0 ' ' , 0 0 ' , 0 ) 0 ( ' ≥ > > > = i i i i i a for C a for C C  (1) 
With deterministic emissions, firm i’s emission reduction Ri equals its abatement ai. With 
stochastic emissions, the firm’s emissions are affected by random and uncorrelated 
shocks. Firm i can only affect the expected level (or more precisely, the probability 
distribution) of emissions through ai. 
There are several reasons why emission shocks may be correlated, either positively or 
negatively, among firms in the same industry. Firms in the same industry and the same 
country are subject to the same market and general economic conditions. Firms in the 
same country also face similar weather conditions. On the other hand, when one firm 
faces difficulties, its competitors may benefit. The former firm will see its emissions 
decline while the latter firms will have higher emissions. 
The probability function for firm i’s emission reduction Ri has the following properties: 
 
Assumption 1. With stochastic emissions, firm i’s emission reduction Ri is described by 
the continuous differentiable probability function Pi(Ri – ai) with support [–ωi,ηi], ωi > 0, 
ηi ≥ 0,  , 0 ) ( lim = − ↓ x P x ω  and the first and highest mode at zero, i.e. Pi(0) ≥ Pi(Ri – ai) for 
all Ri – ai ∈ [–ωi,ηi] and Pi’(Ri – ai) > 0 for all Ri – ai ∈ (–ωi,0). 
 
These conditions imply that the probability function of emission reduction Ri is 
increasing for the lowest values of Ri. It may be increasing throughout, or have one or 
more modes (peaks) in the interior, as long as the first peak is the highest. Figure 1 shows 
a probability function with two modes. For ease of notation, we set Ri at the lowest mode 
                                                           
12 See Ebert (1998) and Boom and Dijkstra (2006) for the different effects of absolute and relative targets.   11
equal to the firm’s abatement. The probability function has to start at zero for ai – ωi in 
order to guarantee an interior solution with individual rewards. An increase in abatement 
moves the probability distribution to the right, without changing its shape. 
The corresponding distribution function is Di(Ri – ai), so that Di(Ti – ai) is the probability 
that firm i’s emission reduction is below its individual target Ti, given that the firm abates 
ai.
13 In Figure 1, this probability is given by the shaded area below the probability 
function to the left of Ti.  
For simplicity, we disregard the possibility of emission trading. We can defend this by 
saying that when the CCAs were agreed, it was unclear when and how emission trading 
would be introduced. In the end, the Emission Trading Scheme started in April 2002, 
halfway through the first compliance period (Oct 2001–Sep 2002). As we saw in Section 
2, delays in verification of surplus emissions led to an increase in the allowance price to 
£12 by September 2002. Thus, emission trading arrived late into the first compliance 
period and suffered from start-up problems during the remainder of this period. We can 
also point to the high cost of verification of ringfenced emissions (£1,000, see Section 2). 
With allowance prices of £2 to £5, verification is only profitable from 200 to 500 tons of 
CO2. Firms might decide not to ringfence at all, especially toward the end of the 
programme. Our estimates of excess emission reduction (Section 2) suggest that at least 
in the first target period, many firms reduced emissions without ringfencing them. Our 
lower bound estimate of excess emission reduction in period 1 is 3.2 Mton which is a 
large amount compared to 3.2 Mton ringfenced but not verified, and 1.44 Mton verified.
14 
Finally, we note that 12% of the firms in period 1 and 5% in period 2 were not recertified 
(Table 3). This means that there was a substantial number of firms that did not only fail to 
reach their target outright, but also chose not to make up for it by buying allowances.  
The sanction for not reaching the target level of emission reduction is a fixed fine f, 
irrespective of the actual reduction level. In the UK CCAs, the sanction is that the firm 
will not receive the 80% discount on the Climate Change Levy for the next two years.
15 
                                                           
13As we have seen in Section 2, the UK CCAs allow for the firm’s target to be relaxed in some 
circumstances where its emissions are higher than expected. We abstract from this possibility in our model.  
14 The amounts for period 2 are 0.2, 5.4 and 1.32 Mton, respectively. 
15 We do not explicitly take the incentive effect of the discounted levy into account. Implicitly, we have 
normalized a firm’s abatement and its total and marginal abatement cost to zero at the point where it would 
operate with the discounted levy. Also, we abstract from the possibility that more abatement in period t   12
Under policy regime ρ, with ρ either equal to I (individual rewards) or G (group rewards), 
the risk-neutral firm i minimizes total cost 
ρ
i TC : 
) ( ) , ( 2 1 i i i i a C f a a TC + =
ρ ρ π        ( 2 )  
where 
ρ π i  is the probability that firm i will be fined (its fine probability, for short) under 
policy regime ρ. 
 
4. Deterministic emissions 
With deterministic emissions, firm i’s emission reduction Ri is completely determined by 
its abatement ai: Ri = ai. With individual rewards, firm i sets its abatement ai equal to the 
target T i if it decides to comply. Its costs of compliance are thus Ci(Ti). If the firm 
chooses not comply, it will not abate at all and pay the fine f. We assume that Ci(Ti) < f, 
thus the firm decides to comply and sets ai = Ti. 
With group rewards, the group target is T = T1 + T2. Now firm i is only fined if both ai < 
Ti and a1 + a2 < T. Firm i’s reaction function is: ai = min (Ti,T – aj). Figure 2 shows the 
reaction functions. The unique Nash equilibrium is point A with ai = Ti, i = 1, 2. Thus, 
with deterministic emissions, firms respond in the same way to individual and group 
rewards.  
 
5. Stochastic emissions 
5.1 Individual rewards 
With individual rewards, firm i is fined if and only if its emission reduction Ri is below 
its individual target Ti. When the firm abates ai, the probability that this happens 
is ) ( i i i a T D − . Substituting this into (2), we see that the firm minimizes: 
) ( ) ( ) ( min i i i i i i
I
i a C f a T D a TC + − =       (3) 
where the superscript I stands for individual rewards. The first order condition is: 
) ( ' ) ( i i i i i a C f a T P = −          ( 4 )  
The second order condition is: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
may make it easier to achieve the target for period t+1. Finally, a firm might actually benefit when its 
competitor is fined, because the fine increases the latter’s cost of production (Salop and Scheffman, 1983). 
For simplicity we also abstract from this as well.   13
0 ) ( ' ' ) ( ' > + − i i i i i a C f a T P         ( 5 )  
On the LHS of first order condition (4) are firm i’s marginal benefits MBi
I of reducing 
emissions. On the RHS are its marginal abatement costs MCi. MCi and MBi
I are depicted 
in Figure 3.
16 The MBi
I curve has its maximum at ai = Ti. We see that in this case, if the 
MCi curve intersects the MBi
I curve at all (which we assume to be the case), it will do so 
twice: at ai
0 and at ai
I. 
When the firm starts to abate, there is at first no benefit, because as long as ai <  Ti – ω, 
emission reduction will always fall short of the target Ti. Once ai >  Ti – ω, there is a 
small probability that emission reduction will exceed the target Ti, but initially the 
marginal benefits of abatement reduction are below the marginal costs. This changes 




marginal benefits of emission reduction exceed the marginal costs. Total costs are 
minimized locally at ai
I, after which they start increasing again. 
There are thus two local cost minima, one at ai = 0 and one at ai = ai
I. We will assume 
that total costs at ai
I are less than f, so that ai
I is the global cost minimum. 
For the most general form of the probability function that satisfies Assumption 1, there 
can be many solutions to (3). We will assume that the global cost minimum is always the 
highest ai
I that solves (3). 
Differentiating (4) totally with respect to f yields the effect of an increase in the fine: 
0


















The inequality follows from (5). Differentiating (4) totally with respect to Ti, the effect of 
an increase in the target level of emission reduction is: 











a C a T P





=        ( 6 )  
The denominator is positive by (5). Abatement is then increasing (decreasing) in the 
target when the probability function is upward (downward) sloping. Figure 4 shows the 
                                                           
16 Figures 3 to 9 were derived and drawn assuming (where applicable) that the two firms’ probability and 
cost functions are identical and quadratic, and their targets are identical. Our formal analysis is not limited 
to these cases, however. The quadratic probability function has ωi = ηi = ω, i = 1,2. Details on how to 
derive the Figures are available from the corresponding author upon request.   14
different effects that an increase in the target can have.
17 Figure 4a shows the case where 
abatement exceeds the target, so that the probability function is increasing. Then an 
increase in the target from Ti to Ti’ results in an increase in abatement from ai
I to ai
I’. In 
Figure 4b abatement is below the target, and the probability function is decreasing. Now 
an increase in the target from Ti to Ti’ results in a decrease in abatement from ai
I to ai
I’. 
Figure 5 shows the firm’s choice of abatement as a function ai
I(Ti) of the target. When the 
target is relatively low, abatement exceeds the target (the ai
I(Ti) curve is above the ai = Ti 
line). Then, as we know from (6), abatement is increasing in the target. Abatement is 
highest for  i i i T a a = = . We will call targets below  i T  realistic and targets above  i T  
ambitious. For ambitious targets, abatement is decreasing in the target. When the target is 
stricter than Ti
*, the firm prefers not to abate at all and incur the fine with certainty. All 
abatement levels between ai
* and  i a  that can be achieved by ambitious targets can also be 
achieved by realistic targets. For instance, abatement level ai’ can be achieved with 
realistic target Ti
r and ambitious target Ti
a. 
The probability function may have several modes and may thus have abatement 
increasing in the target for targets above  i T . However, under Assumption 1 that the first 
peak is the highest, abatement cannot be higher than  i a . Thus it is a general result that all 
abatement levels that can be achieved with ambitious targets can also be achieved by 
realistic targets. 
There is then no environmental reason to choose ambitious targets. Industry obviously 
prefers realistic targets, because the fine probability is lower. When the government does 
not want to antagonize industry needlessly, it will choose realistic targets:
18 
 
Lemma 1. At its optimal abatement effort with individual rewards, firm i abates more 
than its target, so that Pi’(Ti – ai
I) > 0, i.e. the probability function is upward sloping. 
It seems that the targets of the UK Climate Change Agreements were realistic. It is 
unlikely that the same emission reduction could have been realized with more lenient 
targets and higher compliance, because compliance has been very high. Only 12 and 5% 
                                                           
17 Since from (4), dMBi/dai = -Pi’(Ti-ai)f, Pi’(Ti-ai) > 0 implies decreasing MBi in Figure 4. 
18 Expected government revenues from fines are higher with ambitious targets. However, the fine is meant 
as a disciplining device, not as a revenue-raising device.   15
of firms were sanctioned for their (and their industry’s) failing to meet the target in the 
first and second milestone period respectively (see Table 3). In all sectors that failed their 
sectoral target, more than half of the firms reached their individual target. 
 
5.2 Group rewards, individual sanctions 
We now examine the scheme of the UK Climate Change Agreements, where a firm is 
only sanctioned if both it misses its own target and its industry misses its target.  
The probability that firm 1 is fined under group rewards is:
19 
) ¦ Pr( ) Pr( 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 T R T R R T R
G < < + < = π       (7) 
i.e. the probability that its own emission reduction R1 is below its individual target T1 
multiplied by the probability that industry reduction R1 + R2 is below the industry target T 
= T1 + T2, given that R1 < T1. 
Define: 
2 1 τ τ τ τ + ≡ − ≡ − ≡ i i i i i i a R a T v      (8) 
Thus when τi < (>) 0, the actual emission reduction is below (above) the abatement level. 
When vi < (>) 0, the firm abates more than the target. By Lemma 1, vi < 0 with individual 
rewards. In case firm 1 misses its target, τ1 is in the range [ ] 1 1,v ω −  while τ2 can still be 
anywhere in the whole range [] 2 2,η ω − . Substituting (8) into (7), we can write firm 1’s 
fine probability as: 
) ¦ Pr( ) Pr( ) , ( 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 v v v v v v
G < + < < = τ τ τ π       (9) 







) ( ) , ( 2 1 1
v v
G d P v v
ω ω
τ τ π          ( 1 0 )  
with  ) , ( 1 v P τ the scaled probability function of τ, defined as: 
) ( ) Pr( ) , ( 1 1 1 τ τ τ P v v P < ≡          ( 1 1 )  
where  P(τ) is the probability function for τ = τ1 + τ2 with  [] 1 1 1 ,v ω τ − ∈  and 
[] 2 2 2 ,η ω τ − ∈ . Figure 6 illustrates how to derive this scaled probability function for two 
                                                           
19 We will focus on firm 1’s decision, but the analysis for firm 2 follows simply from interchanging the 
labels “1” and “2”.   16
firms with identical quadratic probability functions, so that ω1 = ω2 = η2 = ω. For firm 2 
we need the probability function over the whole range  [ ] ω ω τ , 2 − ∈ , as shown on the 
right of Figures 6a to c. For firm 1 we use the probability function over the range 
[] 1 1 ,v ω τ − ∈  given that  1 1 v < τ , but by (9) we have to multiply this by the probability that 
1 1 v < τ . The relevant function is then simply the original P1(τ1), but only in the interval 
[] 1 1 ,v ω τ − ∈ , as shown on the left of Figures 6a to c. 
Figure 6a shows how to determine the probability density at a τ* between –2ω and v1 – 
ω. When τ1 is at its lowest possible value of –ω, it has to be combined with τ2 = τ* + ω to 
achieve τ*. A slightly higher value for τ1 also gives τ* when combined with an equally 
slightly lower value for τ2. We can keep on increasing τ1 and decreasing τ2 until we come 
to τ2 = –ω, which needs to be paired with τ1 = τ* + ω to achieve τ*. Thus as we let τ1 
increase from –ω to τ* + ω (from light to dark in Figure 6a), the corresponding values for 
τ2 decrease from τ* + ω to –ω (again from light to dark). For each pair of τ1 and τ2 we 
multiply the two probability densities. Finally we add them all up to obtain P(τ*). Since 
τ1 < v1, this procedure only works for τ* + ω < v1. Thus we have established: 
ω τ ω τ τ
ω τ
ω





2 1 1 * 2 ) ( ) ( ) *, ( v for dz z P z P v P      (12) 
Figure 6b shows how to determine the probability density at a τ’ between v1 – ω and 0. 
This τ’ can be achieved with any value of τ1 between –ω and v1. The maximum τ1 value 
of v1 has to be paired with τ2 = τ’ – v1, while the minimum τ1 value of –ω is paired with τ2 
= τ’ + ω. This procedure works as long τ’ + ω is below the maximum τ2 value of ω. We 
have thus found that: 
0 ' ) ' ( ) ( ) , ' ( 1 2 1 1
1
< < − − = ∫
−
τ ω τ τ
ω
v for dz z P z P v P
v
     ( 1 3 )  
Figure 6c shows how to determine the probability density at a τ” between 0 and v1 + ω. 
Now τ” is so high that it cannot be obtained with the lowest values of τ1 anymore. The 
maximum value of τ2 is ω, which has to be paired with τ” – ω > –ω to obtain τ”. As 
before, the maximum τ1 value of v1 has to be paired with τ2 = τ” – v1. Thus we have: 
ω τ τ τ
ω τ
+ < < − = ∫
−
1 2 1 1 ' ' 0 ) ( ) ( ) , ' ' (
1
v for dz z P z P v P
v
     ( 1 4 )    17
Let us now generalize (12) to (14) for τ1 ∈ [–ω1,v1] and τ2 ∈ [–ω2, η2]. We will first 
assume that v1 + ω1 < η2 + ω2, i.e. the range of possible emission reductions is smaller for 
firm 1 than for firm 2, given that firm 1 misses its individual target. This inequality is 
satisfied when the two distribution functions are identical, the case discussed above. The 
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Firm 1’s first order condition for cost minimization under group rewards is then, from (2) 
and (10): 





















− − ω ω
τ τ
π
      ( 1 7 )  
with  ) , ( 1 v P τ  given by (15) or (16). The LHS and the middle expression give firm 1’s 
marginal benefits of abatement MB1
G. The RHS gives firm 1’s marginal cost MC1. 
 
5.3 Comparing individual and group rewards 
We will now examine whether group rewards lead to lower abatement than individual 
rewards. We then compare the firm’s payoffs under the two schemes. 
Under individual as well as group rewards, as shown by (4) and (17) respectively, firm 1 
sets its marginal benefits of abatement equal to the marginal cost of abatement. Figure 7 
shows a possible combination of firm 1’s marginal cost curve MC1 and marginal benefit   18
curves MB1
I for individual rewards and MB1
G for group rewards, given a2
G. In the Figure, 
firm 1’s marginal benefits are lower with group rewards. Combined with an increasing 
MC1 curve, this implies that abatement is lower with group rewards. If we could prove 
that the MB1
G curve for any value of a2
G is below the MB1
I curve, then a1
G would be less 
than a1
I for any increasing MC1 curve. Thus we have: 
 
Lemma 2. If the sensitivity of firm 1’s fine probability 
ρ π1  to its abatement a1 is lower 
with group rewards G than with individual rewards I, the firm will abate less with group 
rewards. That is, a1
G < a1
I if: 



















I G      (18) 
 
We will now check whether inequality (18) holds. With individual rewards, the effect of 
a marginal decrease in v1 on the fine probability is P1(v1) as we know from (4) and (8). 
Thus we have to examine the effect with group rewards and relate it to P1(v1). 
When firm 2 does not abate at all in the Nash equilibrium of group rewards, it will 
certainly fail its individual target.
20 Then for firm 1, there is no difference between 
individual and group rewards, so that it will abate the same amount under both schemes. 
This is not a very interesting case. 
The situation is similar when firm 2 abates a positive amount, but will always fail its 
individual target. Again, firm 2 will not overachieve, which leads firm 1 to abate the 
same under individual and group rewards. 
Let us now return to the case where the two firms have identical quadratic probability 
functions so that ω1 = ω2 = η2 = ω.
21 When firm 2 abates so much that it may reach its 
individual target, v2 < ω. There is no point for firm 2 to abate beyond the point where it 
will reach its individual target for certain. Thus v2 > –ω. Then by (15), v1 + v2 is either in 
the second or the third interval of τ. 
                                                           
20 If there were a possibility that firm 2 could reach its individual target without abatement, then at zero 
abatement it would have positive marginal benefits and zero marginal cost of abatement. Then firm 2 
would abate a positive amount. 
21 The formal analysis for the general case is in the Appendix.   19
Let us first examine the case where v1 + v2 is in the second interval. We illustrated in 
Figure 6a how to calculate the scaled probability function  ) (τ P  in the first interval of τ 
between –2ω and v1 – ω. When v1 falls, the highest value v1 – ω can no longer be 
obtained, i.e. we lose  ) ( 1 ω − v P . Figure 6b illustrated how to calculate  ) (τ P  in the 
second interval of τ between v1 – ω and 0, which contains v1 + v2. When v1 falls, three 
things change in the second interval. First, the lower bound v1 – ω of the interval 
decreases, so that we gain  ) ( 1 ω − v P . This offsets the loss of  ) ( 1 ω − v P  in the first 
interval. Secondly, any τ value in the interior of the second interval can now no longer be 
obtained by adding up τ1 = v1 and τ2 = τ – v1. For every τ, we lose P1(v1) multiplied by 
P2(τ–v1). Figure 8a illustrates how to calculate this loss. The lowest τ value of v1 – ω is 
achieved with τ1 = v1 plus τ2 = –ω. The highest τ value of v1 + v2 is achieved with τ1 = v1 
plus τ2 = v2. The loss is then P1(v1) multiplied by the area WSKJ under the P2(v2) curve 
from –ω to v2. 
The third and final change in the second interval is that the higher bound v1 + v2 
decreases, so that we lose  ) ( 2 1 v v P + . Figure 8b illustrates how to find this  ) ( 2 1 v v P + . 
Analogously to Figure 6b, the minimum τ1 value of –ω results in v1 + v2 when combined 
with the τ2 value of v1 + v2 + ω. The maximum τ1 value of v1 has to be combined with τ2 = 
v2 to yield v1 + v2. Because the P1(τ1) curve is increasing in the interval [–ω, v 1], all 
values of P1(τ1) are less than or equal to P1(v1). The value for  ) ( 2 1 v v P +  is then less than 
P1(v1) times the shaded area JKLM under the P2(τ2) curve from v2 to v1 + v2 – ω. 
The decrease in firm 1’s fine probability under group rewards resulting from a marginal 
decrease in v1 is then less than P1(v1) multiplied by the areas WSKJ + JKLM in Figure 8. 
The combined area of WSLM is less than the total area of WSW* = 1 under the P2(v2) 
curve, because point M is to the left of point W* since v1 + v2 ≤  0 in the second interval 
of τ. The marginal effect of abatement on the fine probability is thus less with group 
rewards than with individual rewards. 
Now let us examine the case where v1 + v2 is in the third interval of τ. Again, we lose 
) ( 1 ω − v P  in the first interval, but regain it in the second interval. The upper bound of the 
second interval remains at 0. As before, for every τ in the interior of the second interval, 
we lose P1(v1) multiplied by P2(τ–v1). The lowest τ value of v1 – ω is again achieved with   20
τ1 = v1 plus τ2 = –ω. The highest τ value is now 0, which is achieved with τ1 = v1 plus τ2 = 
–v1. The loss is then P1(v1) multiplied by the area WSRG in Figure 9 under the P2(v2) 
curve from –ω to –v1. 
Two things change in the third interval of τ. First, for every τ in the interior we lose P1(v1) 
multiplied by P2(τ–v1). The lowest τ value of 0 is achieved with τ1 = v1 plus τ2 = – v1. The 
highest τ value of v1 + v2 is achieved with τ1 = v1 plus τ2 = v2. The loss is then P1(v1) 
multiplied by the area GRKJ in Figure 9 under the P2(v2) curve from – v1 to v2. 
The other change in the third interval is that the highest τ value of v1 + v2 can now no 
longer be obtained, so that we lose  ) ( 2 1 v v P + . Analogously to Figure 6c, the maximum 
τ1 value of v1 has to be combined with τ2 = v2 to yield v1 + v2. The maximum τ2 value of ω 
results in v1 + v2 when combined with the τ1 value of v1 + v2 – ω. Because the P1(τ1) curve 
is increasing in the interval [v1+v2–ω, v1], all values of P1(τ1) are less than or equal to 
P1(v1). The value for  ) ( 2 1 v v P +  is then less than P1(v1) times the shaded area JKW* 
under the P2(τ2) curve from v2 to ω. 
The decrease in firm 1’s fine probability under group rewards resulting from a marginal 
decrease in v1 is then less than P1(v1) multiplied by the areas WSRG + GRKJ + JKW*. 
These areas add up to WSW* = 1. Again, the marginal effect of abatement on the fine 
probability is less with group rewards than with individual rewards. 
Formally, we can show:
22 
 
Proposition 1. In the Nash equilibrium under group rewards, let both firms have a 
positive probability of reaching their individual target. Then both firms abate less with 
group rewards than with individual rewards. 
 
Finally, let us compare a firm’s total cost under individual and group rewards. When the 
targets are the same under both regimes, we can write: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) G G G G G I I G I I
I I I I
a a TC a C f a C f T R T R R a T D
a C f a T D a TC
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, ¦ Pr ) (
) ( ) (
= + > + < < + − >
> + − =
π
 
                                                           
22 The proof is in the Appendix.   21
The first inequality follows from Pr(R1
I + R2
G < T¦ R1
I <T1) < 1 and the second 
inequality from the fact that a1




When the government realizes that group rewards lead to less abatement than individual 
rewards, it may wish to set stricter targets under group rewards. Then it is unclear which 
system firms would prefer. On the one hand, the probability that a firm misses its 
individual target is now higher under group rewards. On the other hand, even if the firm 
misses its individual target, it might not be fined with group rewards.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the incentive system of group rewards and individual 
sanctions, as applied in the UK Climate Change Agreements. Each firm has an individual 
energy saving target, but there are also sectoral targets. Every other year, the firms’ 
performance is evaluated. If the sector as a whole meets its target, all firms in the sector 
continue to receive the 80% discount on the Climate Change Levy for the next two years. 
If the sector does not meet its target, only the firms that met their individual targets 
continue to receive the discount. 
We have compared this system of group rewards to individual rewards. When the firms’ 
actions determine their emissions exactly, there is no difference between the two systems. 
There is a difference when emissions are stochastic. A firm will abate less under group 
rewards than under individual rewards if its probability distribution of emission reduction 
is single-peaked, or at least the first peak is the highest. 
When group rewards lead to less effort than individual rewards, one might wonder why 
the government (or in a more general setting, the principal) would want to use group 
rewards. One reason may be that group performance is easier to observe than individual 
performance, or it is difficult to relate group performance to individual performance. This 
would be the case, for instance, with a football team. However, in the case of the Climate 
Change Agreements, the sectoral organisations collect the data on individual firms’ 
performances from the firms and collate these to calculate the sector’s performance. Thus 
the information on individual performance has to be available in order to establish the 
                                                           
23 Note that both inequalities would also hold if abatement were higher under group rewards.   22
group’s performance. This means that there is no informational reason for the 
government to rely on group rewards. 
We can see two other possible advantages of group rewards. The first advantage is 
fairness. When emissions are stochastic, individual rewards can be regarded as unfair. 
Two identical firms can take exactly the same abatement measures, yet one is punished 
because it pollutes too much, while the other reaches the emission reduction target and is 
rewarded. Reward or punishment is down to luck. The group reward scheme is fairer, 
because one firm’s unintentional underachievement can be compensated by another 
firm’s unintentional overachievement. The probability that one firm is punished while the 
other is not is lower with group rewards. In that sense, group rewards are fairer than 
individual rewards. 
The second advantage of group rewards is that there is something in it for everyone, for 
the government as well as for industry. The government can point to a set of targets that 
look quite ambitious. However, firms in the polluting industry know that even if they do 
not meet their individual target, they may still escape the fine. 
 
Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1 
Without loss of generality, let us consider firm 1. By Lemma 2 and using (4) and (8), firm 
1’s abatement under group rewards is lower than under individual rewards if and only if: 
) (

















        ( A . 1 )  
for all  () 0 , 1 1 ω − ∈ v . When firm 2 abates so much that it may reach its individual target, 
v2 < η2. Should firm 2 want to achieve Pr(τ2 < v 2) = 1, it will do so with the highest 
possible v2 of  –ω2, so that v2 ≥  –ω2. 
We have to consider the following cases: 
 
1. v1 + ω1 < η2 + ω2 and 
a. v1 – ω2 ≤ v1 + v2 ≤ η2 – ω1 
b. η2 – ω1 < v1 + v2 < v1 + η2 
2.  v1 + ω1 ≥ η2 + ω2 
   23
Case 1a. In this case, v1 + v2 is in the second interval of  ) , ( 1 v P τ  in (15). Then from (15) 
and (17): 
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For the first term on the RHS of (A.2) we find from (15): 
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For the second term on the RHS of (A.2) we find from (15): 
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The inequality follows from P1(v1) > P1(z) for all z < v1 by Assumption 1 and v1 < 0 from 
Lemma 1. Since v1 + v2 ≤  η2 – ω1 in the second interval of τ, we can write: 
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Substituting (A.3) to (A.6) into (A.2): 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
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Thus inequality (A.1) is satisfied in Case 1a. 
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From (15), the third term on the RHS of (A.7) can be written as: 
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For the second term on the RHS of (A.9): 
∫∫ ∫
− + − +

















           ( A . 1 1 )  
The inequality follows from P1(v1) > P1(z) for all z < v1 by Assumption 1 and v1 < 0 from 
Lemma 1. Substituting (A.8) to (A.11) into (A.7): 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) , (






































Thus inequality (A.1) is also satisfied in Case 1b. 
Case 2. In this case, v1 + v2 is in the third interval of  ) , ( 1 v P τ  in (16). Then from (16) and 
(17): 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
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The second term on the RHS of (A.12) can be written as: 
∫ ∫ ∫ = − + < − + = +
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The inequality follows from P1(v1) > P1(z) for all z < v1 by Assumption   1  and  v1 < 0 
from Lemma 1. Substituting (A.13) and (A.14) into (A.12): 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) , (






























Thus in Case 2 as well, inequality (A.1) is satisfied. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Absolute savings from baseline, Mt CO2 per annum (with adjusted steel targets) 
  Actual  Target  Actual minus target 
Target Period 1  15.8  6.0 (12.3)  9.8 (3.5) 
Target Period 2  14.4  5.5 (9.3)  8.9 (5.1) 
Source: Defra (2005) 
 














































DPs 31  59.54 52.38 7.16 0.92  6.24
*Mton CO2       Source: Glachant and de Muizon (2006), Table 3 
 
Table 3. UK CCAs: Compliance results from the first two milestone periods 
 2002  2004 
Number of sectors with: 
•  Sectoral target met 
•  All firms recertified 








  5 
Number of target units: 
•  Recertified 
•  Not recertified 
•  Left the agreement 
•  Did not submit data 
 
5,042 (88%) 
   219 
   164 
   317 
 
4,420 (95%) 
     23 
   228 
       4 
Note: Five subsectors of ceramics (with no sectoral target) treated as sectors 
Source: Compiled from Defra (2003, 2005)   29
Figures 
 
Figure 1. A probability function for firm i’s emission reduction Ri   30
 
 
Figure 2. Firms 1 and 2’s reaction functions (thin and thick line, respectively) with 
deterministic emissions and group rewards   31
Figure 3. Marginal benefits and marginal costs of abatement with individual rewards I   32
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AB:  We examine an incentive scheme for a group of agents, where all 
agents are rewarded if the group meets its target. If the group does not 
meet its target, only the agents that meet their individual target are 
rewarded. In environmental policy, the EU burden sharing agreement 
and the UK Climate Change Agreements feature this incentive scheme. 
There is only a difference in outcome between group and individual 
rewards if emissions are stochastic. Group rewards generally lead to 
higher expected emissions than individual rewards. The attraction of 
the group reward scheme may lie in its fairness and its tough-looking 
targets.  